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I. Introduction
In recent years, a controversy has arisen concerning the
taxation of punitive damage awards received in personal injury
suits. Congress has failed to provide the guidance necessary for
1
PACE LAW REVIEW
the courts to decide the tax consequences of damage recoveries.1
Courts have thus been forced to create their own law in this
area through interpretation of the Internal Revenue Code 2
[hereinafter I.R.C.] and the Treasury Regulations.3 Unfortu-
nately, this has led to a recent split among the circuits. 4
Courts have attempted to provide results that seem most
"fair" and reasonable based on theories of taxation and the plain
language of the statutes. 5 However, these attempts have led to
increased controversy.6 Congress has attempted to eliminate
some of the sources of that controversy, but has only succeeded
in creating new issues and renewing the old.7
The purpose of this Comment is to provide some guidance
in the area of taxation of punitive damages. Section II provides
an introduction into the controversy surrounding the taxation
of punitive damage recoveries in personal injury cases. Section
III explores the background of the I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) exclusion,
including a thorough examination of the legislative history, In-
ternal Revenue Service Rulings,8 and case law interpreting the
exclusion. Section IV explores recent judicial interpretation of
the § 104(a)(2) exclusion. The cases discussed demonstrate the
split among the circuit courts of appeals as well as the reasons
for that divergence. Section V discusses the recent amendment
to § 104(a)(2) and the legislative history behind this new
amendment. Finally, Section VI presents the current status of
the law and predicts the future of the exclusion. This section
discusses the issues that are still lingering from the pre-
1. See infra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
2. 26 U.S.C. (1994).
3. Treasury Regulations are the interpretations by the Treasury of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code. JOSEPH M. DODGE, CASES & MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION - PRINCIPLES, POLICY, PLANNING 41 (1985). These regulations are pre-
sumed to be correct and are observed by most courts to the extent that they do not
conflict with the actual wording of the relevant Internal Revenue Code sections.
MICHAEL D. ROSE & JOHN C. CHOMMIE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 9 (3d ed. 1988).
4. See discussion infra part 1V.B.
5. See infra parts III.C., IV.
6. See infra part II.
7. See discussion infra part V.
8. Internal Revenue Service Rulings are opinions issued by the Internal Reve-
nue Service which "describe a hypothetical fact situation, state a result, and briefly
provide reasons [for the result]." DODGE, supra note 3, at 43. These rulings are not
binding upon the courts but do provide some guidance to the public and the I.R.S.
staff regarding how the I.R.S. views particular legal tax issues. Id.
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amended statute9 as well as new issues that have arisen due to
the 1989 amendment.10
This Comment concludes that the most reasonable inter-
pretation of the § 104(a)(2) exclusion is that the plain meaning
of the words of the statute should prevail. For cases that arose
before 1989, Congress has shown no intention to exclude com-
pensatory damages while allowing punitive damage awards to
be taxed.11 Furthermore, the recent amendment provides a ba-
sis for the belief that punitive damage awards will be given "ex-
cludable" status where the case involves physical injury or
physical sickness.1 2
II. The Controversy
During the past several decades, courts have analyzed
what types of damage awards should be includable in gross in-
come' 3 and what amounts are entitled to exclusion from gross
income.14 The most obvious starting point is § 61 of the Internal
Revenue Code.' 5 This section defines gross income as "all in-
9. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1954).
10. The Amendment referred to is the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 7641(a), 103 Stat. 2106, 2379 (1989) (codified at I.R.C.
§ 104(a)(2) (1994)). See discussion infra part V.
11. See infra notes 270-72 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 29-30 and accompanying text. See also infra notes 298-304
and accompanying text.
13. See infra note 17, discussing the Supreme Court's definition of gross
income.
14. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 432 (1955)
(holding that the punitive damages portion of a recovery was taxable gain to the
taxpayer); Commissioner v. Miller, 914 F.2d 586, 591 (4th Cir. 1990) (finding that
punitive damages were not excludable under § 104(a)(2) since they represented a
"windfall" to the plaintiff); Roemer v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 693, 700 (9th Cir.
1983) (holding that a lump sum recovery in a defamation suit was excludable from
gross income since it was received on account of "personal injury"); Kemp v. Com-
missioner, 771 F. Supp. 357, 359 (N.D. Ga. 1991) (concluding that the punitive
damages portion of a settlement of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action comprises gross in-
come under § 104(a)(2)); Estate of Moore v. Commissioner, 67 T.C.M. (CCH) 1925
(1994) (holding that punitive damages received in settlement of a lawsuit for mali-
cious prosecution and invasion of privacy are excludable from gross income), rev'd,
53 F.3d 712 (5th Cir. 1995); Threlkeld v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1294, 1309 (1986)
(holding that damages received in settlement of a claim for malicious prosecution
of a civil proceeding are received on account of "personal injuries" and are there-
fore excludable under § 104(a)(2)).
15. I.R.C. § 61 (1994).
3
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come from whatever source derived."16 By plain meaning, this
section would include amounts received as a punitive damage
award through a lawsuit or settlement.17 Congress, however,
has carved out certain exceptions to taxable income.' 8 One such
exception is I.R.C. § 104(a)(2), entitled "Compensation for Inju-
ries or Sickness." 19 This section provides that "gross income
does not include . . . the amount of any damages received
(whether by suit or agreement... ) on account of personal inju-
ries or sickness."20
The § 104(a)(2) exclusion refers only to "any damages re-
ceived" and does not specify any particular type of damage
award.2' Since Congress has not interpreted the parameters of
16. I.R.C. § 61(a) (1994).
17. This section of the Internal Revenue Code was intended to be applied
broadly. Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 334 (1940) (citing Helvering v. Mid-
land Mutual Life Ins. Co., 300 U.S. 216 (1937)). The Supreme Court has stated
that gross income includes all "undeniable accessions to wealth, clearly realized,
and over which the taxpayers have complete dominion." Commissioner v. Glen-
shaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955).
Since a punitive damage award received through a lawsuit or a settlement of a
lawsuit would yield an accession to wealth, such an award would be taxable under
§61. Id.
18. All of these exclusions are found in I.R.C. §§ 71-130 (1994). DODGE, supra
note 3, at 1. They consist of:
(1) Non-alimony payments (e.g., child support) received by one spouse from
another following a separation or divorce (§ 71).
(2) The proceeds of life insurance (§ 101(a)).
(3) Gifts and bequests received (§ 102(a)).
(4) Interest received on state and local bonds (§ 103).
(5) Insurance and damage recoveries for personal injuries and sickness
(§ 104).
(6) The first $100 of dividends on aggregate corporate stock received dur-
ing a year (§ 116).
(7) Scholarship and fellowship awards (§ 117).
(8) The first $125,000 of net profits from the sale of a personal residence
after attaining the age of 55 (§ 121).
(9) Foreign "earned" income of Americans working abroad (§ 911).
(10) Certain (but by no means all) "fringe benefits" provided by employers
to employees (see, e.g., § 79, 105, 106, 119, 125, and 132).
Id. at 1-2.
19. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1994).
20. Id.
21. The term "any damages" has been interpreted differently by several
courts. See infra parts III.C.2-3, lV.B. Nowhere does it differentiate between com-
pensatory damages, punitive damages, or nominal damages received on account of
personal injury. This has lead several commentators to analyze Congress' intent.
See, e.g., Paul C. Feinberg, Federal Income Taxation of Punitive Damages Awarded
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol16/iss1/8
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this exclusion, several courts, faced with the task of interpreta-
tion, have determined that the exclusion applies to any dam-
ages-compensatory, punitive and nominal22-that are
received on account of personal injury.2 However, other courts
have perceived the exclusion to apply only to damages that are
received as compensation for personal injury.24
Due to the disparity in judicial interpretations of the
§ 104(a)(2) exclusion, Congress amended the section in 1989 by
adding the sentence: "[the exclusion] shall not apply to any pu-
nitive damages in connection with a case not involving physical
injury or physical sickness."25 This amendment explicitly made
punitive damages received in a non-physical injury suit includ-
able in the gross income of the taxpayer. However, the "double-
negative" language of the amendment has left intact much of
the controversy created by the original version of this section.26
in Personal Injury Actions, 42 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 339 (1992); James D. Egleston,
Taxation of Punitive Damage Awards From Personal Injury Actions: Should the
Section 104(a)(2) Exclusion Apply?, 20 Omo N.U.L. REv. 117 (1993).
22. These three types of damages are distinguished as follows:
Compensatory damages are such as will compensate the injured party
for the injury sustained, and nothing more; such as will simply make good or
replace the loss caused by the wrong or injury....
[Punitive] damages are damages on an increased scale, awarded to the
plaintiff over and above what will barely compensate him for his property
loss, where the wrong done to him was aggravated by circumstances of vio-
lence, oppression, malice, fraud, or wanton and wicked conduct on the part
of the defendant....
Nominal damages are a trifling sum awarded to a plaintiff in an action,
where there is no substantial loss or injury to be compensated, but still the
law recognizes a technical invasion of his rights or a breach of the defend-
ant's duty, or in cases where, although there has been a real injury, the
plaintiff's evidence entirely fails to show its amount.
BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 390-92 (6th ed. 1990).
23. See, e.g., Estate of Moore v. Commissioner, 67 T.C.M. (CCH) 1925 (1994),
rev'd, 53 F.3d 712 (5th Cir. 1995); Robinson v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 116 (1994);
Horton v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 93 (1993), aff'd, 33 F.3d 625 (6th Cir. 1994).
24. See, e.g., Wesson v. United States, 48 F.3d 894 (5th Cir. 1995); Hawkins v.
United States, 30 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2576 (1995);
Reese v. United States, 24 F.3d 228 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Kemp v. Commissioner, 771
F. Supp. 357 (N.D. Ga. 1991).
25. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239,
§ 7641(a), 103 Stat. 2106, 2379 (1989) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 104(a)). See
discussion infra part V.
26. See infra text accompanying note 268.
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In addition, new issues have also arisen involving the ex-
cludability of punitive damages where there is physical injury
involved. First, the amendment did not settle the controversy
over whether punitive damages may always be excluded in
cases involving physical injury or sickness. 27 The negative lan-
guage of the amendment has lead to confusion on this issue.2
It is possible, by negative inference, that punitive damages re-
ceived where there is physical injury are excludable from gross
income. 29 On the other hand, it is also possible that the
§ 104(a)(2) exclusion must be applied as it always has been, ex-
cept where there is no physical injury.30
Second, it is not clear whether punitive damages are ex-
cludable where there is no claim for physical injury yet there
are manifestations of physical injury.31 Solving this problem
will require a thorough analysis of the word "involving" as used
in the amendment.32 Finally, courts will have to determine the
27. Although no cases have yet come up under the amended version of
§ 104(a)(2), it is clear that the controversy has not been settled by the amendment
since the amendment does not explicitly state when punitive damages can or can-
not be excluded from gross income, with the exception of cases that do not involve
physical injury or sickness. See infra part VI.B.
28. Many commentators have come to different conclusions in their interpre-
tation of the amendment. See, e.g., Feinberg, supra note 21; Egleston, supra note
21; Henning, Recent Developments in the Tax Treatment of Personal Injury and
Punitive Damage Recoveries, 45 TAX LAw. 783 (1992); Day, Taxation of Punitive
Damages: Interpreting Section 104(a)(2) after the Revenue Reconciliation Act of
1989, 66 WASH. L. REV. 1019 (1991); Jaeger, Taxation of Punitive Damage Awards
After the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1989, 68 TAXEs 368 (1990).
29. Although no judicial interpretation of the amendment has yet occurred,
some commentators have found that the amendment requires exclusion of punitive
damages where there is physical injury or sickness. See David G. Jaeger, Taxation
of Punitive Damage Awards: The Continuing Controversy, 57 TAX NOTES 109
(1992).
30. At least one commentator has adopted this second viewpoint. Egleston,
supra note 21, at 119. This view requires the assumption that Congress did not
intend punitive damages from physical injury actions to ever be covered by the
104(a)(2) exclusion. Thus, the courts are free to interpret the exclusion as they
always have, as if there were no amendment. Id.
31. An example of this problem would be a defamation suit. The tort of defa-
mation itself is not a physical injury cause of action; rather, it involves injury to
reputation. However, there may be physical manifestations of injury such as pain
and suffering, emotional distress, or physical symptoms which result from emo-
tional distress. See Jaeger, supra note 29, at 115.
32. Courts should resolve whether a case "involving" physical injury requires
that the claim itself be one for physical injury, or that there simply be some physi-
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol16/iss1/8
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effects of the amendment on liquidated damage33 awards result-
ing from discrimination suits.34
Although the 1989 amendment did settle some of the con-
troversy, the courts will still have to deal with many of the pre-
amendment issues since cases under the pre-amended
§ 104(a)(2) are still being adjudicated.3 5 The courts therefore
must rely on their own reasoning and the reasoning of the
courts that have already interpreted the pre-amended section.
Thus, the controversy involving the pre-amended section
remains.
III. History of the § 104(a)(2) Exclusion
This section discusses the history behind the § 104(a)(2) ex-
clusion from gross income. First to be addressed is the legisla-
tive history of the statute from the first internal revenue acts
until the present status of the exclusion. Various Internal Reve-
nue Service rulings that have been relevant to this issue are
also explored. Finally, the case law in this area will be
cal injury accompanying the claim. Since no cases have been brought thus far
dealing with this issue, courts will have to rely on their own judgment.
33. Liquidated damages is the term applicable when
the amount of damages has been ascertained by the judgment in the action,
or when a specific sum of money has been expressly stipulated by the parties
to a bond or other contract as the amount of damages to be recovered by
either party for a breach of the agreement by the other.
BLAci's LAw DICrIoNARY 391 (6th ed. 1990). In the context of a discrimination suit,
liquidated damages are available in cases of willful discrimination. Schmitz v.
Commissioner, 34 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1994).
34. In the past, liquidated damage awards have been a source of controversy.
Some courts have found that liquidated damages serve a compensatory function
and are therefore excludable from income under § 104(a)(2). See, e.g., Schmitz v.
Commissioner, 34 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1994); Downey v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 150
(1991), rev'd, 33 F.3d 836 (7th Cir. 1994).
Other courts, however, have found that liquidated damages serve as a punish-
ment to the tortfeasor and are therefore not excludable from gross income. See,
e.g., Downey v. Commissioner, 33 F.3d 836 (7th Cir. 1994).
35. Although the amendment was passed in 1989, the cases that have ap-
peared thus far still require the application of the pre-amended statute. The rea-
son for this seemingly confusing treatment is the second section of the amendment
which gives the amendment future effect only. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 7641(b), 103 Stat. 2106, 2379 (1989). This sec-
tion states that "the amendment... shall apply to amounts received after July 10,
1989." Id. Since the cases that have been brought thus far involved amounts re-
ceived prior to July 10, 1989, the amended section 104(a)(2) has not been analyzed.
7
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presented in order to provide a basis for the present rulings on
the issue.
A. The Statutory History of I.R.C. § 104(a)(2)
Although the statutory history in this area is scarce, Con-
gress has provided some guidance in dealing with the exclusion
of damages from gross income. Congress first addressed the ex-
clusion in the Revenue Act of 1918.36 This statute stated that
"gross income.., does not include... amounts received.., as
compensation for personal injury or sickness ... [or] any dam-
ages received . . .on account of such injuries or sickness." 37
Although Congress provided some interpretive guidance merely
by creating the Act, this section of the Act was, nevertheless,
still filled with many ambiguities. Most obvious was the Act's
failure to address punitive damages. In fact, only the first part
of this section refers to damages received as compensation for
injury or sickness. 38 The statute did not explicitly state
whether the term "any damages" in the second part of the sec-
tion included punitive damages. It was therefore unclear
whether those damages had to be compensatory in nature. Fur-
thermore, the "on account of" language received no explanation
and so constituted a source of further confusion. This language
was retained in later versions of the statute and the confusion
has therefore persisted until the present time.39
This first statutory interpretation was subsequently codi-
fied in 193940 without revision. The statute was recodified in
1954 as § 104(a) of the Internal Revenue Code.41 This version
actually split section 213(b)(6) of the 1918 Act into two separate
sections of § 104(a).42 Section 104(a)(1) incorporated the first
part of § 213(b)(6) regarding amounts received under work-
36. Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 254, § 213(b)(6), 40 Stat. 1057, 1065-66
(1918).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. The present version of the statute is codified in I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1994).
Although the statute has changed somewhat from its original version, the "on ac-
count of" language has remained as it was in the Revenue Act of 1918. See I.R.C.
§ 104(a)(2) (1994).
40. I.R.C. § 22(b)(5) (1939).
41. I.R.C. § 104(a) (1954).
42. Id. The 1954 version of this exclusion is virtually identical to the present
I.R.C. § 104. See supra text accompanying note 20.
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men's compensation acts,43 while § 104(a)(2) incorporated the
second part regarding receipt of damages on account of personal
injury.44 The 1954 version, however, eliminated the "compensa-
tion" language of§ 213(b)(6) and left the courts to determine the
meaning of "any damages" and "on account of." Unfortunately,
this new version did little to settle the controversy surrounding
the exclusion. 45 On the contrary, it created even greater contro-
versy over whether punitive damages should be excluded from
gross income under the new statute.46
The statute has been recodified several times since 1954
but the language remained unchanged until the 1989 amend-
ment.47 The new amendment was part of the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1989.4 Congress amended § 104(a)(2) to
read: "[this section] shall not apply to any punitive damages in
connection with a case not involving physical injury or physical
sickness."49
B. Relevant Internal Revenue Service Rulings
The Internal Revenue Service has made several Revenue
Rulings concerning the § 104(a)(2) gross income exclusion. 50
Although the I.R.S. has "flip-flopped" on its approach to this is-
43. I.R.C. § 104(a)(1) (1954).
44. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1954).
45. Since the 1954 codification merely split § 22(b)(5) of the 1939 code into two
subsections of § 104, the 1954 version had little effect on the statute itself.
46. Due to the use of the word "compensation," it is not clear whether the 1939
version limited the exclusion to compensatory damages in the first part of
§ 22(b)(5). There is no relevant interpretation of the exclusion that explains
whether it was intended to encompass punitive damage recoveries.
However, when the 1954 code was created, § 104(a)(2) did not include the
word "compensation." The word "compensation" only appeared in § 104(a)(1).
Congress thus increased the ambiguity of the exclusion for damages received for
injuries or sickness by eliminating wording that might have provided some gui-
dance in this area. If the word "compensation" had appeared in § 104(a)(2) also,
the present controversy might have been avoided.
47. The Amendment referred to is the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 7641(a), 103 Stat. 2106, 2379 (1989) (codified at I.R.C.
§ 104(a)(2) (1994)). See infra part V for further discussion of the Act.
48. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act § 7641(a), 103 Stat. at 2379.
49. Id. Since the present focus is on the historical background of the
§ 104(a)(2) exclusion, this amendment will be thoroughly discussed in part V of
this article.
50. See supra note 8 for a discussion of the significance of Revenue Rulings.
1995] 119
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sue over the years, its analysis provides some guidance in this
area.51
The first such ruling was made in 1975.52 In Revenue Rul-
ing 75-45, the I.R.S. addressed the issue of whether an amount
received from an insurance company by the executor of the es-
tate of a decedent was excludable from the gross income of the
estate under § 104(a)(2) of the 1954 I.R.C. 53 This case con-
cerned a decedent who was killed in a plane crash and whose
estate received a settlement from the carrier's liability insur-
ance. 54 In deciding whether this amount was excludable from
the taxpayer's gross income, the Service found that § 104(a)(2)
referred to "any damages received . . . on account of personal
injuries or sickness."5- Therefore, any damages, "whether com-
pensatory or punitive, received on account of personal injuries
or sickness are excludable from gross income."56 The Service's
determination was based upon Revenue Ruling 58-57857 which
explained that:
Where a contract between an insurance company and the owner
of an airplane provides for the payment of specified amounts to a
person injured in such plane or to such person's beneficiary ...
upon the execution of a release of all claims for damages against
the insured, such amounts are damages under § 104(a)(2) of the
Code, and, as such, are excludable from gross income of the
recipient.58
The Service concluded that the amount received was excludable
from the estate's gross income under § 104(a)(2). 59
51. See infra note 211 and accompanying text.
52. Rev. Rul. 75-45, 1975-1 C.B. 47. Although this ruling was later revoked
by Revenue Ruling 84-108, 1984-2 C.B. 32, it is instructive in that it allowed for
the exclusion of punitive damages from gross income. See infra text accompanying
notes 60-70.
53. Rev. Rul. 75-45, 1975-1 C.B. at 47.
54. Id. The liability insurance required that the decedent's beneficiary exe-
cute a full release of all claims for wrongful death against the insured. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Rev. Rul. 58-578, 1958-2 C.B. 38.
58. Rev. Rul. 75-45, 1975-1 C.B. at 47 (citing Rev. Rul. 58-578, 1958-2 C.B.
38).
59. Rev. Rul. 75-45, 1975-1 C.B. at 47.
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Nine years later, the I.R.S. reversed its position, revoking
Revenue Ruling 75-45. 60 In Revenue Ruling 84-108, the I.R.S.
found that amounts received by a surviving spouse and child in
consideration of the release from liability under a wrongful
death act, which provided exclusively for payment of punitive
damages, are includable in their gross incomes.6 1
This ruling also involved a death caused by a plane crash
for which the decedent's spouse and child received a sum from
the aircraft liability insurance policy. 62 This policy required the
estate to release all claims for wrongful death.63 In determining
whether this sum was taxable, the I.R.S. first looked to the na-
ture of a wrongful death claim under applicable state law64 and
found that it was purely punitive in nature.65 The Service then
looked to the Supreme Court's decision in Commissioner v.
Glenshaw Glass Co." which held that punitive damages re-
ceived in an antitrust case and in a fraud case represented ac-
cessions to wealth and, as such, were includable in gross
income. 67
The Service also looked to the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Starrels v. Commissioner6 in determining that punitive dam-
60. Rev. Rul. 84-108, 1984-2 C.B. at 32. The most probable explanation for
the Service's reversal on this issue is the Supreme Court's decision in Commis-
sioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955). See discussion infra text ac-
companying notes 66-67 and part III.C.1.
61. Rev. RUl. 84-108, 1984-2 C.B. at 34.
62. Id. at 33.
63. Id.
64. Id. Treasury Regulations require that the Service examine the nature of
the state law since payments made under a policy in lieu of prosecution of a suit for
damages constitute damages received within the meaning of § 104(a)(2). Id. See
Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c) (1994).65. Rev. RUl. 84-108, 1984-2 at 33. The wrongful death act in Alabama pro-
vides exclusively for the payment of punitive damages. ALA. CODE § 6-5-410, IV
(1993). Thus, the damages are determined according to the degree of fault of the
tortfeasor, rather than according to the amount necessary to compensate the survi-
vors for loss sustained. Rev. Rul. 84-108, 1984-2 C.B. at 33.
The Internal Revenue Service pointed out that a different situation would
arise where the state wrongful death statute provides for purely compensatory
damages. Id. Amounts received due to wrongful death in these states would be
excluded from gross income under § 104(a)(2) because they serve to compensate
the survivors for their actual loss sustained by reason of the wrongful death. Id.
66. 348 U.S. 426 (1955). See infra part 11.C.I.
67. Rev. RUl. 84-108, 1984-2 C.B. at 33-34 (citing Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. at
431).
68. 304 F.2d 574 (9th Cir. 1962). See infra note 124.
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ages are not awarded "on account of personal injury" because
they do not restore loss of capital and are determined with ref-
erence to the defendant's degree of fault.69 Based upon these
court decisions, the I.R.S. concluded that the damages awarded
in this case were punitive in nature and therefore not excluda-
ble from gross income under § 104(a)(2). 70
The Service revised the compensatory/punitive damages
distinction in Revenue Ruling 85-98. 71 In this case, the tax-
payer received a lump-sum settlement of a libel suit for injury
to personal reputation. 72 The Service confirmed that the por-
tion of a settlement which represented compensatory damages
was excludable from gross income under § 104(a)(2), while the
portion considered to be punitive damages was includable in the
taxpayer's gross income under § 61 of the Internal Revenue
Code.7 3
The Internal Revenue Service has thus made clear its view
that punitive damages are "accessions to wealth" under Glen-
shaw Glass and are therefore not excludable from gross income
under § 104(a)(2). However, the I.R.S.'s absolute reversal in its
approach towards the taxation of punitive damage awards may
be indicative of its future indecisiveness regarding this issue.
C. Cases Interpreting the Personal Injury Damages Exclusion
Over the years, several courts have interpreted the
§ 104(a)(2) exclusion.7 4 Rather than achieving a consistent ap-
proach to the exclusion, these decisions have created even
greater controversy. However, the reasoning employed in these
cases is instructive in determining the present status of the
exclusion.
69. Rev. Rul. 84-108, 1984-2 C.B. at 34.
70. Id.
71. Rev. Rul. 85-98, 1985-2 C.B. 51.
72. Id. at 51.
73. Id. at 52. Section 61 of the Internal Revenue Code states that "gross in-
come means all income from whatever source derived." I.R.C. § 61(a) (1994). Any
such income is considered to be gross income unless an exception is specifically
provided for elsewhere in the Code. Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S.
426, 430 (1955). See also supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
74. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Miller, 914 F.2d 586 (4th Cir. 1990); Roemer v.
Commissioner, 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983); O'Gilvie v. United States, No.
CIV.A.90-1075-B, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13307 (D. Kan. Aug. 26, 1992).
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1. Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co. 75
The Supreme Court first addressed the taxation of punitive
damages in Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co.76 The issue
before the Court was "whether money received as exemplary
damages for fraud or as the punitive two-thirds portion of a
treble-damage antitrust recovery must be reported by a tax-
payer as gross income under § 22(a) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1939."77
In Glenshaw, the Glenshaw Glass Company asserted
claims against Hartford-Empire Company for exemplary dam-
ages for fraud and treble damages for injury to its business due
to Hartford's violation of the federal antitrust laws. 78 The par-
ties settled for approximately $800,000. 79 Glenshaw did not re-
port this amount as gross income and the Commissioner
determined a deficiency.80 The Commissioner then instituted
suit.8 1
75. 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
76. Id. This case is actually a consolidation of two cases, Glenshaw Glass Co.
v. Commissioner, 18 T.C. 860 (1952), aff'd, 211 F.2d 928 (3rd Cir. 1954), rev'd, 348
U.S. 426 (1955), and William Goldwin Theatres, Inc. v. Commissioner, 19 T.C. 637
(1953), aff'd sub nom. Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 211 F.2d 928 (1954),
rev'd, 348 U.S. 426 (1955). Since these cases have similar factual backgrounds,
only the facts of Glenshaw Glass, 18 T.C. 860 (1952) will be discussed here.
77. 348 U.S. at 427. Section 22(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939,
I.R.C. § 22(a) (1939), is equivalent to the present Internal Revenue Code § 61(a).
See supra notes 15-17. Both state in relevant part that "gross income includes
income derived from any source whatever." I.R.C. § 61(a) (1994). See I.R.C. § 22(a)
(1939).
78. 348 U.S. at 427-28.
79. Id. at 428.
80. Id. There are two methods by which a suit may come to the tax court to be
resolved. JAMES J. FREELAND ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXA-
TION, at 28-29 (8th ed. 1994). The first is that which is represented in this case: a
taxpayer may fail to report a certain amount on his income tax return. Id. at 28.
The Commissioner may then determine a deficiency and bring suit in the Tax
Court to collect the deficient amount. Id.
The second method occurs when a taxpayer reports an amount as income on
his tax return, or pays an amount asserted as a deficiency by the Commissioner.
Id. at 29. He may then later file an administrative claim for a refund for an
amount he deems to have been overpayment. Id. If the Commissioner disallows
this refund, the taxpayer may then bring suit in the Tax Court or the district court
in order to recover that amount. Id.
81. 348 U.S. at 428.
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The Tax Court determined that $324,529.94 represented
punitive damages.8 2 Both the Tax Court and the Court of Ap-
peals determined that the entire settlement amount was ex-
cludable by the taxpayer.8 3 To resolve recent controversy that
had developed in this area, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari. 84
The Court noted that the language used in section 22(a)
"was used by Congress to exert... the 'full measure of its taxing
power.'"85 Also, the Court noted that Congress intended "to tax
all gains except those specifically exempted."86 The Court found
that in this case there were "undeniable accessions to wealth,
clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers have complete
dominion. The mere fact that the payments were extracted
from the wrongdoers as punishment for unlawful conduct can-
not detract from their character as taxable income to the
recipients."8 7
The Court also determined that the amount of the settle-
ment representing punitive damages could not be considered a
gift and did not fall within any of the other exceptions set forth
in the Internal Revenue Code.88 The Court concluded that the
punitive damages portion of the recovery was therefore taxable
income to the taxpayer.8 9
The most noticeable omission from this case was a discus-
sion of the exclusion for damages received on account of per-
sonal injury. Although the exclusion for damages received due
to personal injury or sickness had already been codified by
1955,90 the Court did not consider the exclusion in this case.
Still, the analysis by the Court in Glenshaw provides useful in-
82. Id.
83. Id. at 427-28.
84. 348 U.S. 813 (1954).
85. 348 U.S. at 429 (citation omitted). See supra note 77.
86. 348 U.S. at 430 (citing Commissioner v. Jacobson, 336 U.S. 28, 49 (1949)).
87. Id. at 431.
88. Id. at 432. Punitive damages cannot be considered gifts. The Supreme
Court has stated that "a gift... proceeds from a detached and disinterested gener-
osity." Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285 (1960) (citation omitted).
Certainly, punitive damages are not given through disinterested generosity on the
part of the payor. See also supra note 18 for discussion of other exclusions from
gross income.
89. 348 U.S. at 432.
90. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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sight into the theories of taxation and also provides the basis for
many later court decisions regarding the taxation of punitive
damages.
2. Roemer v. Commissioner9l
In Roemer v. Commissioner, the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit was presented with the issue of whether the lump
sum recovery under a defamation suit, which included both
compensatory and punitive damages, was excludable from gross
income under § 104(a)(2). 92 The taxpayer, Paul Roemer, owned
an insurance business.93 After the Retail Credit Company is-
sued a defamatory credit report which caused Roemer to be de-
nied an insurance license, Roemer brought suit for libel in
California. 94 The jury awarded both compensatory and punitive
damages. 95 Roemer reported only a portion of the damage
award as income on his 1975 tax return and the Commissioner
determined a deficiency. 96
The Tax Court found that the compensatory damages were
includable in gross income because they were not received due
to personal injury.97 The court also found that the punitive
damages were includable as "accessions to wealth" since the
compensatory damages were intended to reimburse the tax-
payer for injury to his professional reputation.98 Thus the Tax
Court concluded that the entire recovery was taxable and did
not fall within the § 104(a)(2) exclusion.99
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the de-
cision of the Tax Court. 10 The court first looked to the nature of
the underlying tort action to determine if the award should be
included in gross income.1 01 It stated that "[tihe relevant dis-
tinction that should be made is between personal and nonper-
91. 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983).
92. Id. at 696.
93. Id. at 694.
94. Id. at 695.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Roemer v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 398, 407 (1982).
98. Id. at 408.
99. Id. at 407-08.
100. Roemer, 716 F.2d at 701.
101. Id. at 697.
19951 125
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sonal injuries, not between physical and nonphysical
injuries."10 2 The court found that "[s]ince... the defamation of
an individual is a personal injury under California law, the
compensatory damages received... are excludable from gross
income under § 104(a)(2), as would be the compensatory dam-
ages received on account of any personal injury."10 3
The court stated that normally punitive damages are not
excludable from gross income under the analysis of Commis-
sioner v. Glenshaw Glass.1°4 However, the court looked to Reve-
nue Ruling 75-45105 and stated that "the Commissioner
liberally interprets § 104(a)(2) to exclude punitive damages as
well as all compensatory damages where there has been a per-
sonal injury."10 6 The court therefore concluded that the puni-
tive damages received by Roemer on account of his "personal
injury" in this case were excludable from gross income under
§ 104(a)(2). 10 7
3. Commissioner v. Miller108
In Commissioner v. Miller, the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit was faced with the issue of whether the punitive
damages portion of a defamation suit settlement is excludable
from gross income under § 104(a)(2).10 9 In this case, the tax-
payer "obtain[ed] a large settlement of two lawsuits brought for
defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress."1" 0
102. Id.
103. Id. at 700. The court was referring to section 45 of the California Civil
Code which provides that: "Libel is a false and unprivileged publication by writ-
ing, printing, picture, effigy, or other fixed representation to the eye, which exposes
any person to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or which causes him to be
shunned or avoided, or which has a tendency to injure him in his occupation." CAL.
CIv. CODE § 45 (West 1982).
104. 716 F.2d at 700. See supra part uII.C.1.
105. Rev. Rul. 75-45, 1975-1 C.B. 47. See supra text accompanying notes 52-
59.
106. 716 F.2d at 700. The court here actually steers around stare decisis by
distinguishing the Supreme Court's holding in Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass
Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955). The court did note that the Supreme Court found puni-
tive damages includable in gross income, but nonetheless distinguished Glenshaw
Glass and chose to follow the Internal Revenue Service's ruling in Revenue Ruling
75-45, 1975-1 C.B. 47. Roemer, 716 F.2d at 700.
107. 716 F.2d at 700.
108. 914 F.2d 586 (4th Cir. 1990).
109. Id. at 587.
110. Id.
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She did not include any of the settlement proceeds in her gross
income and the Internal Revenue Service determined a defi-
ciency for the entire amount.'
The Tax Court found the whole settlement to be excludable
from gross income." 2 The court refused to draw distinctions be-
tween the kinds of personal injuries or the kinds of harm flow-
ing from those injuries." 3 The court concluded that the "plain
meaning" of § 104(a)(2) indicated that the exclusion applied to
"any damages" and therefore that punitive damages should be
excluded." 4 The court also interpreted the phrase "on account
of" to suggest causation." 5 Since the punitive damages were on
account of the personal injury, they were excludable under
§ 104(a)(2)." 6
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, however, re-
versed the Tax Court's decision." 7 The court found that "[a] pu-
nitive damages award 'does not attempt to compensate the
plaintiff for harm suffered by him, but rather is exemplary in
nature and is over and above any award of compensatory dam-
ages.' "118 The court also found the "on account of" language of
§ 104(a)(2) to be ambiguous since it could mean either "but-for"
causation or "sufficient causation."" 9
Because of the ambiguous nature of the statute, the court
looked to extrinsic aids for interpretation. 120 First, it noted that
"exclusions to income are to be construed narrowly."2l There-
fore, "[gliven that § 104(a)(2)'s language is not plain ... [a] more
restrictive view of what kinds of damages are excludable from
gross income under the section [must be adopted]." 122
111. Id.
112. Miller v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 330, 341 (1989).
113. Id. at 334-37.
114. Id. at 338.
115. Id. at 339.
116. Id. at 340-41.
117. 914 F.2d at 592.
118. Id. at 589 (citing Exxon Corp. v. Yarema, 516 A.2d 990, 997 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1986), cert. denied, 522 A.2d 392 (Md. 1987)).
119. Id. at 589-90. The distinction drawn between "but-for" and "sufficient"
causation did not affect the court's holding, but merely provided a means by which
the court could bring in extrinsic aids to interpretation.
120. Id. at 590.
121. Id. (citing Commissioner v. Jacobson, 336 U.S. 28, 49 (1949)).
122. Id.
1995] 127
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Second, the court found that interpreting the § 104(a)(2) ex-
clusion to apply only to compensatory damages comports better
with the statute's underlying purpose.123 The court observed
that damages are only excludable from gross income because
they restore a loss of capital.124 Since punitive damages do not
serve to make the plaintiff whole, § 104(a)(2) does not extend to
this type of damages. 125 Thus, the court concluded that the pu-
nitive damages portion of the plaintiff's recovery was not ex-
cludable under § 104(a)(2) since it represented pure "windfall"
to the plaintiff.1 26
IV. Recent Judicial Interpretation of the
§ 104(a)(2) Exclusion
In the past several years, courts have tried to define the
parameters of the § 104(a)(2) exclusion. These courts have
dealt with the excludability of punitive damages, 27 ADEA liqui-
123. Id.
124. Id. The court was referring to the Ninth Circuit's decision in Starrels v.
Commissioner, 304 F.2d 574 (9th Cir. 1962). The Ninth Circuit found that
"[diamages paid for personal injuries are excluded from gross income because they
make the taxpayer whole from a previous loss of personal rights-because, in ef-
fect, they restore a loss to capital." Id. at 576.
The "return of capital" theory was discussed by dissenting Justice Trott in
Hawkins v. United States, 30 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 132 L. Ed. 2d
(1995). He equated the theory to the concept of basis in tax law. Id. at 1087 (Trott,
J., dissenting). "If I buy a property for $100 and sell it for $150, my $50 gain is
taxable. My $100 basis, or return of capital, is not." Id. In applying this theory to
punitive damage recoveries, punitive damages are not deemed to be a "return of
capital" since they make a plaintiff more than whole. Id. Only damages received
that serve to make the plaintiff whole are excludable from gross income. Id.
125. 914 F.2d at 590. The court referred to the Supreme Court's holding that
"[p]unitive damages ... cannot be considered a restoration of capital for taxation
purposes." Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. 426, 432 n.8 (1955). See
supra part III.C.1.
126. 914 F.2d at 591. When this case again reached the Fourth Circuit on
appeal (after being remanded), the court adhered to its prior ruling that "the por-
tion of the settlement proceeds representing punitive damages was not entitled to
the exclusion from gross income under 26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2).... " Miller v. Com-
missioner, No. 94-1383, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 16111, at *1 (4th Cir. Jun. 30,
1995). The court noted that it gave careful consideration to the Supreme Court's
holding in United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229 (1992), in making its decision. Id.
at *2.
127. See, e.g., Wesson v. United States, 48 F.3d 894, 902 (5th Cir. 1995) (hold-
ing that "§ 104(a)(2) does not exclude noncompensatory punitive damages from
gross income"); Horton v. Commissioner, 33 F.3d 625, 630 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding
that where the underlying claim is one for personal injury, the full recovery is
128
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dated damages,12s and prejudgment interest.129 Although these
decisions are helpful in determining the excludability of dam-
ages in general, they will not be fully explored because the focus
of this Comment is on the excludability of punitive damages.
Presently there is no consensus among the courts on the exclud-
ability of punitive damages, but recent judicial decisions are in-
structive in predicting the future of the § 104(a)(2) exclusion.
A. United States v. Burke1 30
Although this case did not explicitly deal with the exclud-
ability of punitive damages, it gives meaningful insight into the
treatment of the § 104(a)(2) exclusion. In United States v.
Burke,131 the Supreme Court determined whether payment re-
ceived in settlement of a backpay claim under Title VII is ex-
cludable from gross income under § 104(a)(2) as "damages
received ... on account of personal injuries."3 2 The taxpayers
in Burke sought backpay and injunctive relief due to their em-
ployer's unlawful discrimination in the payment of salaries on
the basis of sex.13 The parties reached a settlement and federal
income taxes were withheld from the amount of the award. 34
excludable, including the punitive damages); Hawkins v. United States, 30 F.3d
1077, 1084 (9th Cir. 1994) (concluding that § 104(a)(2) does not exclude noncom-
pensatory punitive damages), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2576 (1995); Reese v. United
States, 24 F.3d 228, 231 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (reasoning that Congress did not intend
§ 104(a)(2) to exclude noncompensatory punitive damages from gross income).
128. See, e.g., Schmitz v. Commissioner, 34 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1994); Downey
v. Commissioner, 33 F.3d 836 (7th Cir. 1994).
ADEA is the abbreviation for the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29
U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988).
129. See, e.g., Brabson v. United States, 859 F. Supp. 1360 (D. Colo. 1994).
130. 504 U.S. 229 (1992).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 230. "Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it an unlawful
employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, be-
cause of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.'" Id. at 237-
38 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988)). If a violation was found, the Court
could enjoin the discriminatory practice or award either reinstatement, backpay or
other equitable relief. Id. at 238.
Title VII was later amended in 1991 to allow recovery of both compensatory
and punitive damages in certain circumstances. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L.
No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071.
133. 504 U.S. at 231.
134. Id.
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The plaintiffs brought a refund action for the amount withheld,
claiming that the amount was excludable from gross income
under § 104(a)(2). 135 The district court found that since the tax-
payers obtained only backpay rather than compensatory or
other damages, settlement proceeds were not excludable under
§ 104(a)(2). 3 6
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed. 3 7 The
court stated that the exclusion under § 104(a)(2) turns on
"whether the injury and claim are personal and tort-like in na-
ture .... "138 "If the answer is in the affirmative, then that is
'the beginning and end of the inquiry.'- 13 9 The court concluded
that gender discrimination constituted a "tort-like, personal in-
jury" and damages received for such injury were therefore ex-
cludable under § 104(a)(2). 140 It "rejected the Government's
attempt to distinguish Title VII, which authorizes no compensa-
tory or punitive damages, from other statutes thought to re-
dress personal injuries."14' The Supreme Court granted
certiorari to "resolve [the] conflict among the [clourts of
[aippeals concerning the exclusion of Title VII backpay awards
from gross income under § 104(a)(2)." 142
The Court, accepting the Sixth Circuit's approach to the is-
sue, held that the backpay awards were not excludable under
§ 104(a)(2) since Title VII is not a tort-like cause of action. 143 In
reaching this conclusion, the Court noted that Congress in-
tended section 61(a)14 to exert the full measure of its taxing
135. Id. at 232.
136. Id.
137. Burke v. United States, 929 F.2d 1119, 1124 (6th Cir. 1991).
138. Id. at 1121.
139. Id. at 1123. The court here relied on the Tax Court's ruling in Threlkeld
v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1294 (1986), aff'd, 848 F.2d 81 (6th Cir. 1988). The court
stated in Threlkeld:
[Wihether the damages received are paid on account of 'personal injuries'
should be the beginning and the end of the inquiry. To determine whether
the injury complained of is personal, we must look to the origin and charac-
ter of the claim and not to the consequences that result from the injury.
Id. at 1299 (citation omitted).
140. 929 F.2d at 1122.
141. 504 U.S. at 232 (citing United States v. Burke, 929 F.2d 1119, 1121-23
(6th Cir. 1991)).
142. Id. at 233.
143. Id. at 239-41.
144. I.R.C. § 61(a) (1992).
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power and to bring within the definition of income any accession
to wealth. 145 The question presented was whether Title VII dis-
crimination constituted a "personal injury" under § 104(a)(2). 146
The Court agreed with the Sixth Circuit "insofar as it focused
. . .on the nature of the claim underlying [the] damages
award."147 In order to come within the § 104(a)(2) exclusion, it
must be shown that the legal basis for recovery was tort-like. 14
The Court looked to the types of damages available in a Ti-
tle VII claim to determine if the claim was tort-like. 149 It stated
that "one of the hallmarks of traditional tort liability is the
availability of a broad range of damages to compensate the
plaintiff 'fairly for injuries caused by the violation of his legal
rights.'"150 Thus, the availability of compensatory or punitive
damages is an indication that a claim is tort-like. 151
Applying this test, the Court found that since neither puni-
tive nor compensatory damages were available under Title
VII,152 the claim was not tort-like.153 Furthermore, "[n]othing in
[the] remedial scheme [of Title VII] purports to recompense...
the plaintiff for any of the other traditional harms associated
with personal injury, such as pain and suffering, emotional dis-
tress, harm to reputation, or other consequential damages."154
Thus, the Court concluded, that since the claim did not redress
a tort-like personal injury within the meaning of § 104(a)(2), the
entire settlement was includable in gross income. 155
145. 504 U.S. at 233. The Court looked to Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331,
334 (1940), and Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955).
146. 504 U.S. at 237.
147. Id.
148. Id. See also Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c) (1994) (stating that "the term 'dam-
ages received'... means an amount received... through prosecution of a legal suit
or action based upon tort or tort type rights ...
149. 504 U.S. at 237 n.7.
150. Id. at 235 (citing Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 257 (1978)).
151. Id. at 240.
152. At the time of the Burke decision, only backpay and equitable relief were
available under Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1988) (amended 1991). See
supra note 132 for text of Title VII.
153. 504 U.S. at 241.
154. Id. at 239.
155. Id. at 241-42. The Court did note, however, that "discrimination could
constitute a 'personal injury'. . . if the relevant cause of action evidenced a tort-like
conception of injury and remedy." Id. at 239. The Court provided the example of
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1991), which "permits victims of race-based employment discrim-
ination to obtain a jury trial at which 'both equitable and legal relief, including
1995]
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The Burke case has provided a test to be used in Title VII
cases. However, the Supreme Court did not expressly address
punitive damages in its decision. This has led to confusion in
the interpretation of the Burke decision and its applicability to
other cases.
B. The Recent Circuit Split in Cases Involving Purely
Punitive Damages
There is currently a split among the courts of appeals re-
garding the exclusion of punitive damages under § 104(a)(2). 156
Although the pre-amended version of § 104(a)(2) applied 57 in
all of these cases, the decisions are instructive in determining
the future of the recently amended § 104(a)(2) exclusion and its
interpretation.
1. Horton v. Commissioner'58
In Horton v. Commissioner, the taxpayers suffered personal
injuries when a gas leak caused their home to explode. 159 The
jury awarded the taxpayers both compensatory and punitive
damages. 160 The taxpayers excluded the punitive damage
award from their gross income on their 1985 tax return and the
Commissioner determined a deficiency. 161 They filed a petition
with the Tax Court for a redetermination of the deficiency.162
compensatory and, under certain circumstances, punitive damages' may be
awarded." Id. at 240 (citing Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S.
454, 460 (1975)).
156. On one side of the split, the Sixth Circuit in Horton v. Commissioner, 33
F.3d 625 (6th Cir. 1994), has found punitive damages to be excludable from gross
income under § 104(a)(2). The only other circuits to decide this issue have found
punitive damages to be includable in the taxpayer's gross income. See Wesson v.
United States, 48 F.3d 894 (5th Cir. 1995); Hawkins v. United States, 30 F.3d 1077
(9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2576 (1995); Reese v. United States, 24 F.3d
228 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Commissioner v. Miller, 914 F.2d 586 (4th Cir. 1990).
157. The 1989 amendment to § 104(a)(2) was not applicable because the cases
dealt with amounts received prior to July 10, 1989. In the amendment, Congress
provided that "t]he amendment ... shall apply to amounts received after July 10,
1989, in taxable years ending after such date." Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 7641(b)(1), 103 Stat. 2106, 2379 (1989). See infra
part V for discussion of the Act.
158. 33 F.3d 625 (6th Cir. 1994).
159. Id. at 626.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
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The Tax Court determined that the punitive damages were
excludable under § 104(a)(2). 163 The court reaffirmed its hold-
ing in Miller v. Commissioner164 that "[t]he plain meaning of the
broad statutory language [of § 104(a)(2)] simply does not permit
a distinction between punitive and compensatory damages."165
Therefore, the court held that the "any damages" language in
§ 104(a)(2) includes punitive damages. 166 In addition, the court
stated that:
The beginning and end of the inquiry should be whether the dam-
ages were paid on account of "personal injuries." This inquiry is
answered by determining the nature of the underlying claim.
Once the nature of the underlying claim is established as one for
personal injury, any damages received on account of that claim,
including punitive damages, are excludable.16 7
The Tax Court also noted that the Supreme Court's analy-
sis in Burke1 68 established that "punitive damages are not
merely an incidental result of a personal injury claim ....
[since] they are 'inextricably bound up' with the concept of tort
type rights."169 "As one of the hallmarks of traditional tort
claims, it is logical to conclude that punitive damages are re-
ceived 'on account of' such claims."170 Applying this analysis,
the court concluded that the claim was tort-like and therefore,
that the punitive damages should be excluded from gross in-
come under § 104(a)(2). 171
The Tax Court "rejected the concept that § 104(a)(2) ex-
cludes only amounts that restore lost capital as opposed to
amounts that would otherwise constitute gains or accessions to
163. Horton v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 93, 101 (1993).
164. Miller v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 330 (1989), rev'd, 914 F.2d 586 (4th Cir.
1990). See supra text accompanying notes 108-24.
165. 100 T.C. at 95 (citing Miller, 93 T.C. at 338).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 96. The court relied on the Supreme Court's analysis in Burke, 504
U.S. 229 (1992). See supra part IV.A.
168. 504 U.S. 229 (1992).
169. 100 T.C. at 99. The Supreme Court in Burke, 504 U.S. 229 (1992), looked
to the remedies available in order to determine whether the claim was tort-like.
Id. at 234-35. The Court found that punitive damages were an indicia of a tradi-
tional tort claim. Id. at 240. See supra part V.A.
170. 100 T.C. at 99.
171. Id. at 101.
1995]
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wealth."172 The court justified its finding by noting that, in Ken-
tucky, punitive damages are awarded "because the injury has
been increased by the manner [in which] it was inflicted.' "173
Therefore, punitive damages are partially compensatory in na-
ture and "are allowed by way of remuneration for the aggra-
vated wrong done."174
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.175 It
agreed with the Tax Court that "[a]lthough [Burke's]. . . holding
is not applicable,... its method of assessing whether a claim is
excludable ... is instructive."176 The court focused on whether
the injury was personal and if the underlying claim was tort-
like in nature.177 In this case, the underlying claim was one for
personal injury, and therefore the full recovery was excludable,
including the punitive damages.178
The court stated that its holding was consistent with the
1989 Amendment which allowed punitive damages in physical
injury cases to be excluded. 179 The court criticized the Commis-
sioner's view that punitive damages should not be excluded be-
cause they do not represent a return of capital.180 It stated that
172. Id. at 96. The Tax Court followed its prior decision in Downey v. Com-
missioner, 97 T.C. 150 (1991). In Downey, the court stated that:
Whether the damages paid to the tort victim reflect a substitute for amounts
or items otherwise taxable or a substitute for amounts or items to be enjoyed
without a tax consequence is irrelevant .... [Section 104(a)(2)] permits the
exclusion of damages that are a substitute for ... amounts or items that
otherwise would be taxable or would potentially produce taxable benefit ....
In sum, under section 104(a)(2), we will focus on whether the injury is per-
sonal and on whether the claim resulting in payment of damages is... tort-
like, not on the consequences of the personal injury or the actual damages
suffered.
Id. at 163-64.
173. Horton v. Union Light, Heat and Power Co., 690 S.W.2d 382, 390 (Ky.
1985) (holding that punitive damages serve both a compensatory and punitive
function)).
174. 100 T.C. 100 (citing Horton, 690 S.W.2d at 390).
175. Horton v. Commissioner, 33 F.3d 625, 626 (6th Cir. 1994).
176. Id. at 629.
177. Id. at 630.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 631. The court refers to the 1989 amendment created by Congress
in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989. See supra note 25 and accom-
panying text and infra part V. Although the amendment does not apply to this
case since the recovery occurred before July 10, 1989, the court pointed out that its
holding is consistent with the amendment. 33 F.3d at 631. See also supra note 35.
180. 33 F.3d at 632.
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the "return to capital" theory'8 ' is a false dichotomy since the
theory "tihat money damages make the injured person whole is
merely a legal fiction." 82
2. Hawkins v. United States 8 3
In Hawkins v. United States, the taxpayers received a puni-
tive damage award due to the defendant's breach of his duty of
good faith and fair dealing. 84 The Hawkinses reported the pu-
nitive damages on their tax return but later filed for a refund. 8 5
The Commissioner denied the refund and the Hawkinses filed
suit in the district court. 8 6 The District Court for the District of
Arizona found that the Hawkins' punitive damages were ex-
cludable from gross income. 87 The court reasoned that the
plain meaning of § 104(a)(2) compels exclusion of punitive
damages. 188
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, con-
cluding that § 104(a)(2) does not exclude noncompensatory pu-
nitive damages. 8 9 It agreed with the Fourth Circuit in Miller'9°
that § 104(a)(2) is ambiguous and there is no "plain mean-
ing."I9' The court also noted that "punitive damages.., which
do not purport to compensate the taxpayer for personal injuries
and which bear no relation to the severity of the taxpayer's inju-
ries, are not necessarily awarded 'on account of' personal in-
jury; rather, they are awarded 'on account of' the tortfeasor's
egregious conduct."192
Thus, the Ninth Circuit added another step to the Burke
analysis. 193 In addition to having a "tort-like" cause of action,
181. See supra note 124.
182. 33 F.3d at 632.
183. 30 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2576 (1995).
184. Id. at 1079.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 1080.
189. Id. at 1084.
190. 914 F.2d 589-90. See discussion supra part III.C.3.
191. Hawkins, 30 F.3d at 1080. See supra notes 115-24 and accompanying
text.
192. Hawkins, 30 F.3d at 1080.
193. United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229 (1992). The Supreme Court in
Burke had simply looked at the underlying claim to see if it was tort-like in nature.
Id. at 237. When it found that the claim was not tort-like (since traditional tort
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the damages must also be received "on account of" personal in-
jury. 194 In other words, simply finding a tort-like cause of action
is not the end of the inquiry.195
The court also found that excluding punitive damages is in-
consistent with § 104(a)(2)'s title and purpose. 196 First, the
court pointed to the title of the statute, "Compensation for Sick-
ness and Injury."197 Second, the court reasoned that the "return
to capital" rationale justified including punitive damages in
gross income since they do not purport to compensate the victim
for injuries suffered. 198 Awarding punitive damages does not re-
store lost capital, "but rather . . . punish[es] the tort-feasor
whose wrongful action was intentional or malicious, and... de-
ter[s] him and others from similar extreme conduct."199
In sum, the court concluded that a punitive damage award
is a pure windfall to the plaintiff and should be included in
gross income. 200 This is consistent with the view that exclusions
from gross income, such as § 104(a)(2), should be construed
narrowly.201
Judge Trott provided a strong dissent.2 2 Trott stated that
the "any damages" language suggests "all damages."20 3 He fur-
ther noted that "[t]he language [is] unambiguous, permitting no
distinction between punitive and compensatory damages."204 "If
Congress intended to exclude only compensatory damages from
gross income, it certainly could have made that distinction ex-
damages were not available), the Court ended its inquiry. Id. at 239-41. See supra
part IV.A.
The Supreme Court did not indicate that "if the underlying cause of action is
tort-like, all damages, regardless of their purpose, are excludable." Hawkins, 30
F.3d at 1081. "The [Supreme] Court did not state that courts should look exclu-
sively at the nature of the claim underlying the damage award." Id.
194. Hawkins, 30 F.3d at 1081.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 1082 n.7.
197. Id. at 1083. This is the title for the entirety of § 104. I.R.C. § 104 (1994).
198. Hawkins, 30 F.3d at 1083-84.
199. Id. at 1083 (citing City of Newport v. Fact Concert Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 266
(1981)).
200. Id. at 1083-84.
201. Id. at 1080. See supra text accompanying notes 85-86.
202. Hawkins, 30 F.3d at 1084 (Trott, J., dissenting).
203. Id. (citing Miller v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 330, 338 (1989), rev'd, 914
F.2d 586 (4th Cir. 1990)).
204. Id.
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plicit."205 Furthermore, "punitive damages are received on ac-
count of personal injury because punitive damages are not
available unless a personal injury has occurred."2°6
Trott criticized the majority for "glossing over" the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Roemer,2 7 which relied on Revenue Ruling
75-45208 to find that punitive damages were excludable from
gross income. 2°9 He further pointed out that the Internal Reve-
nue Service has "ffip-flopped" on this issue, therefore undermin-
ing the idea that Revenue Ruling 84-108210 is the final and
correct decision.211
Judge Trott also disagreed with the two-part test ex-
pounded by the majority. He urged the court to adopt the hold-
ing of the Tax Court in Horton, which stated: "The beginning
and end of the inquiry should be whether the damages were
paid on account of 'personal injuries.' "212 Criticizing the major-
ity, he pointed out that "[tihe Burke Court did not mention any
additional requirements for exclusion under § 104(a)(2)." 213 Re-
lying on the Burke analysis, he reasoned that since "punitive
damages are one of the primary indicia of a personal injury
claim ... it follows that punitive damages are received 'on ac-
count of personal injury.'"214
Furthermore, Judge Trott pointed out that the 1989
amendment to § 104(a)(2)215 suggests that all punitive damages
205. Id.
206. Id. at 1085.
207. Roemer v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 693 (6th Cir. 1983). See supra part
III.C.2.
208. Rev. Rul. 75-45, 1975-1 C.B. 47. See supra notes 52-57 and accompany-
ing text.
209. Hawkins, 30 F.3d at 1084-85 (Trott, J., dissenting). Judge Trott points
out that the Roemer court also interpreted the statute and did not blindly rely on
Revenue Ruling 75-45. Id.
210. Rev. Rul. 84-108, 1984-2 C.B. 32. See supra notes 59-68 and accompany-
ing text.
211. Hawkins, 30 F.3d at 1085 (Trott, J., dissenting).
212. Id. (citing Horton, 100 T.C. at 96). The Supreme Court adopted this anal-
ysis in Burke, 504 U.S. at 232.
213. 30 F.3d at 1085 (Trott, J., dissenting).
214. Id. at 1086.
215. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 7641,
103 Stat. 2106, 2379 (1989) (codified at I.R.C. § 104(a)(2)). See discussion supra
notes 46-48 and infra part V.
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received before 1989 are not taxable. 216 He stated that the ma-
jority's view that all punitive damages are taxable would mean
that the amendment serves to broaden the § 104(a)(2) exclusion
rather than narrow it.217 Also, Trott believed that the major-
ity's interpretation renders the amendment meaningless if all
punitive damages are taxable. 218
Finally, Judge Trott pointed out that the "return to capital"
theory does not explain the § 104(a)(2) exclusion because "com-
pensatory damages, like punitive damages, can represent a
windfall in addition to a return to capital."219 Money damages
can serve to more than compensate for the injury suffered and
therefore make the injured party "more than whole."220 Further-
more, this theory does not explain why punitive damages re-
ceived in physical injury cases after 1989 are excludable. 221
3. Reese v. United States 222
In Reese v. United States, Elizabeth Reese sued her em-
ployer for termination of employment based on gender discrimi-
nation and sexual harassment.223 Following a jury trial, she
was awarded both compensatory and punitive damages.2
Reese included the punitive damages as gross income in her
1987 federal income tax return.225 She later filed an amended
return for a refund which was disallowed by the Internal Reve-
216. Hawkins, 30 F.3d at 1086 (Trott, J., dissenting). Judge Trott stated that
such a view is the only method of harmonizing the original statute with the
amended statute. Id. He pointed out that the amendment served to narrow the
§ 104(a)(2) exclusion by not allowing punitive damages to be excluded where no
physical injury or sickness was involved. Id. If the amendment were to accom-
plish this goal, punitive damages must have been excludable from gross income in
all personal injury cases prior to the amendment. Id. at 1086-87.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 1087.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. 24 F.3d 228 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
223. Id. at 229. Although these facts appear to be similar to those in Burke,
504 U.S. 229 (1992), they are distinguishable since this suit was not brought under
Title VII. Rather, Reese brought suit under the District of Columbia Human
Rights Act, D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2501 (1981). 24 F.3d at 229.
224. Id.
225. Id.
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nue Service.226 Reese then filed suit for refund in the Court of
Federal Claims.227
The Court of Federal Claims granted summary judgment
for the Government.22 The court found that § 104(a)(2) is am-
biguous.229 It "adher[ed] to the general tenet that the language
'gross income' is to be construed broadly and exemptions to
gross income are to be construed narrowly."230 "The court...
concluded that the exclusion . . . does not encompass punitive
damages because the title and subject matter of section 104 are
limited to payments received as 'compensation' for injuries or
sickness." 231
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed, rea-
soning that "Congress did not intend section 104(a)(2) to ex-
clude from gross income noncompensatory damages such as
punitive damages."232 It determined that the "on account of"
language of the statute is ambiguous and susceptible to at least
two conflicting interpretations. 233 The court must therefore
"look... to the design of the statute as a whole and to its object
and policy."234 First, the court noted that the title of the statute
is "Compensation for Injuries or Sickness."2 5 Second, "section
104's enumerated categories encompass only the replacement of
losses resulting from injury or sickness."236  The court also
stated that "taxable income" should be broadly construed with
the purpose to tax income comprehensively. 237 "Exemptions, on
the other hand, are specifically stated and should be construed
with restraint in the light of the same policy."238
226. Id. at 229-30.
227. Id. at 230.
228. Reese v. United States, 28 Fed. Cl. 702, 703 (1993).
229. Id. at 705.
230. 24 F.3d at 230.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 231.
233. Id. at 230. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
234. 24 F.3d at 231 (citing Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 158
(1990)).
235. Id. (referring to the title of I.R.C. § 104 (1994)).
236. Id. See I.R.C. § 104(a)(1)-(5) (1994).
237. 24 F.3d at 231 (citing Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426
(1955)).
238. Id. (citing Commissioner v. Jacobson, 336 U.S. 28, 49 (1949)).
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In addition, punitive damages are not intended to compen-
sate the injured party, but are to punish the tortfeasor for his
wrongful conduct.23 9 They are "damages above and beyond the
amount which you may award for compensatory and nominal
damages."4 ° In sum, punitive damages "in no way resemble a
return of capital."41 In light of all of these factors, the court con-
cluded that "punitive damages are not excludable from gross in-
come pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2) (1987) because such
damages are not received on account of personal injury within
the meaning of the Code."? 2
4. Wesson v. United States 24
In Wesson v. United States, the Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals joined the Ninth, Federal, and Fourth Circuits in holding
that noncompensatory punitive damages are not excludable
from gross income under § 104(a)(2). 24 In Wesson, the taxpay-
ers received a jury award of $ 1.5 million in punitive damages in
a bad-faith action against Mutual Life Insurance Company.24 5
Initially, they reported the punitive damage award in their
1988 tax return, but later requested a refund.24 The Internal
Revenue Service denied the request and the taxpayers subse-
quently filed suit in district court.247
The District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi
ruled against the taxpayers, holding that the punitive damages
recovered in the bad-faith cause of action were not awarded "on
account of personal injuries."4 The court stated that the action
"simply involved a breach of insurance contract" and "the bene-
239. Id. (citing City of Newport, 453 U.S. at 266).
240. Id. at 232.
241. Id. at 233.
242. Id. at 235.
243. 48 F.3d 894 (5th Cir. 1995).
244. Id. at 896. The Fifth Circuit enforced its holding in Wesson in Moore v.
Commissioner, 53 F.3d 712 (5th Cir. 1995). In Moore, the court held that the puni-
tive damages awarded under Texas law are not compensatory in any way and are
therefore not excludable from gross income under § 104(a)(2). Id. at 713.
245. Wesson v. United States, 843 F. Supp. 1119, 1120 (S.D. Miss. 1994). The
taxpayers were originally awarded $8 million in punitive damages, but this
amount was reduced to $1.5 million through remittitur. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 1123.
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ficiaries [could not] seriously contend that they received the pu-
nitive-damages award 'on account of personal injuries' as
required under section 104(a)(2) for purposes of exclusion from
taxation."249 In other words, the award was "deemed a taxable
accession of wealth."250
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district
court's ruling that the punitive damage award was not ex-
empted from taxation under § 104(a)(2). 251 In its analysis, the
court first looked to the language of the statute.252 It agreed
with the Ninth, Federal, and Fourth Circuits that the "on ac-
count of" language in § 104(a)(2) was ambiguous. 253 The court
also found ambiguity in the term "personal injury."25 4 However,
the court noted that the Supreme Court in Burke255 eliminated
that ambiguity by "link[ing] identification of a personal injury
to traditional tort principles."256
With Burke in mind, the court looked to Mississippi law to
determine whether a bad faith cause of action is one that re-
dresses a personal injury. 257 Since "punitive damages are not
allowed [under Mississippi law] absent such malicious, reckless,
willful or gross disregard for the rights of the insured as to con-
stitute an independent tort," the court concluded that the bad
faith cause of action sounded in tort and was therefore one re-
dressing a personal injury.258
Establishing this "threshold inquiry," the court of appeals
went on to determine whether the punitive damages were re-
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Wesson v. United States, 48 F.3d 894, 902 (5th Cir. 1995).
252. Id. at 896.
253. Id. at 897. The court believed that § 104(a)(2) was subject to at least two
conflicting interpretations. Id. "[It] could mean that all damages recovered in a
personal injury suit are excluded, or it could mean that only those damages that
purport to compensate the plaintiff for the personal injury suffered are received on
account of personal injury." Id. See supra text accompanying notes 117-20, 189,
255-58.
254. 48 F.3d at 897.
255. See supra part V.A.
256. Wesson, 48 F.3d at 897. The Burke Court found that where traditional
tort law remedies were available, the legal action is based upon tort and therefore
involves personal injury. Id. (citing Burke, 504 U.S. at 259).
257. Id.
258. Id. at 898.
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ceived on account of that personal injury.259 Since the "on ac-
count of" language in § 104(a)(2) was deemed ambiguous, the
court looked to "the design of the statute as a whole and to its
object and policy."26° It noted that § 104 is titled "Compensation
for Injuries or Sickness" 261 and that punitive damages do not
serve to compensate the plaintiff, but to punish the
tortfeasor.262 Furthermore, the underlying purpose behind ex-
cluding damages from gross income under § 104 is that "they
restore a loss of capital."263 Taking both these points into con-
sideration, the court found that punitive damages are not
awarded on account of personal injuries. 264 It concluded that
"the class of damages that may be excluded are those that com-
pensate an individual for some loss"265 and that "'Congress did
not intend section 104(a)(2) to exclude from gross income non-
compensatory damages such as punitive damages.'" 266
V. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989267
Until 1989, Congress had not specifically addressed the ex-
clusion of punitive damages under § 104(a)(2). In 1989, Con-
gress amended § 104(a)(2) to read: "[Section 104(a)(2)] shall not
apply to any punitive damages in connection with a case not
involving physical injury or physical sickness."268 Thus, if a tax-
payer recovers punitive damages in a case not involving physi-
cal injury, this amount will be includable in gross income under
the amended § 104(a)(2). However, due to the double-negative
language of the amendment, it is not clear whether punitive
259. Id. The court stated that "[u]nder Burke the threshold inquiry in deter-
mining whether a damage award is excludable from gross income pursuant to
§ 104(a)(2) is to determine if the underlying cause of action seeks to redress a per-
sonal injury." Id. at 897.
260. Id. at 898 (citing Reese, 24 F.3d at 231 (quoting Crandon v. United
States, 494 U.S. 152, 158 (1990))).
261. Id
262. Id. at 899.
263. Id. (quoting Hawkins, 30 F.3d at 1083). For a discussion of the "return to
capital" theory, see supra notes 198-99 and accompanying text.
264. 48 F.3d at 900.
265. Id. at 899 (emphasis in original).
266. Id. (quoting Reese, 24 F.3d at 231).
267. Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 7641, 103 Stat. 2106, 2379 (1989) (codified at
I.R.C. § 104(a) (1994)).
268. Id.
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damages received for a claim involving physical injury would be
excludable.
Furthermore, one commentator has stated that "while this
change could be viewed as expressing congressional intent re-
garding punitive damages, the legislative history indicates that
the real focus of the amendment was damages received for non-
physical injuries."2 9 The committee report accompanying the
bill indicates that the amendment was in response to recent ju-
dicial decisions which allowed the exclusion of punitive dam-
ages in cases that did not involve physical injury or physical
sickness. 270 In enacting the amendment, the House Ways and
Means Committee stated that the "[exclusion of punitive dam-
ages from gross income] is inappropriate where no physical in-
jury or sickness is involved."271
The Committee report would have limited the application
of the income exclusion "to damages received on account of per-
sonal injuries or sickness in a case involving physical injury or
physical sickness." 272 Although its report would have explicitly
made both compensatory and punitive damages excludable in
cases involving physical injury or sickness, 273 the amendment
as passed did not go that far.2 74
Although it appears that Congress has finally spoken on
the subject of punitive damages, it is still unclear how the
amendment should be interpreted. For instance, it remains un-
certain whether punitive damages can be excluded where there
is physical injury, as opposed to cases "not involving physical
injury or sickness."275 Furthermore, the amendment does not
explain the meaning of "in connection with a case involving
physical injury or physical sickness."276 This could refer either
to a claim of physical injury, or to a claim for nonphysical per-
sonal injury where there have been physical manifestations of
injury, such as pain and suffering or emotional distress.
269. Jaeger, supra note 29, at 111.
270. H.R. REP. No. 247, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 1354-55 (1989), reprinted in
1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1906, 2825.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act § 7641.
275. Id.
276. See supra note 268 and accompanying text.
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By enacting the amendment, Congress has given the courts
limited guidelines in which to view the § 104(a)(2) exclusion.
Unfortunately, cases will continue to face the courts in which
the pre-amended statute still applies.277 This is because the
amendment has only prospective effect. 278 For these cases, the
courts must continue to interpret when and if punitive damages
are excludable from gross income under § 104(a)(2).
VI. The Present and Future Status of the
§ 104(a)(2) Exclusion
A. The Status of Pre-Amended § 104(a)(2)
As noted previously, cases continue to come down under the
pre-amended version of the statute.279 However, there is still no
consensus on the treatment of punitive damages.280 Thus,
courts must continue to interpret the exclusion and determine
whether to exclude punitive damages from gross income. The
most plausible interpretation of the pre-amended section is that
it excludes punitive damages from gross income.
The plain language of the statute should be given defer-
ence. The language clearly indicates that the exemption applies
to "any damages," without distinguishing between punitive and
compensatory damages. If Congress had intended to exclude
only compensatory damages, it could have done so explicitly in
the statute.
Furthermore, the "on account of" language lacks the ambi-
guity that many courts have sought to find in it. Punitive dam-
ages are "inextricably bound up"281 with a claim for personal
injury and therefore cannot be said to be entirely separated
from it., Punitive damages are not awarded unless injury is
shown. 282 It logically follows that they are received on account
of that injury.
277. See, e.g., Downey v. Commissioner, 33 F.3d 836 (7th Cir. 1994); Estate of
Wesson v. United States, 843 F. Supp. 1119 (S.D. Miss. 1994), aff'd, 48 F.3d 894
(5th Cir. 1995); Kemp v. Commissioner, 771 F. Supp. 357 (N.D. Ga. 1991).
278. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act § 7641(b). See supra note 35.
279. See supra note 277.
280. For a discussion of Horton, Hawkins, and Reese, see supra part IV.B. 1-3.
281. Horton, 100 T.C. at 99 (citing United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 237
n.7 (1992)). See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
282. See supra note 22.
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The reasoning of courts which have found punitive dam-
ages to be includable in gross income may appear to be sound at
first glance, yet it is inconsistent with the language of the stat-
ute.28 3 First, the plain meaning of the statute clearly indicates
otherwise. As noted above, the plain language of the statute
indicates that "all damages" should be excludable, not just those
that compensate the victim for the injury suffered. Second, the
Supreme Court's decision in Burke states that the beginning
and end of the inquiry should be whether the underlying claim
is tort-like.284 Once it is determined that the claim is tort-like,
and therefore one for personal injury, all damages resulting
therefrom should be excludable from gross income under
§ 104(a)(2) as "damages received on account of personal injury
or sickness."
Finally, courts have arbitrarily created new steps in the
analysis that clearly contradict the Burke Court's ruling on the
issue.28 5 The Supreme Court explicitly stated that the only de-
termination to be made was whether the claim was tort-like.2
That was meant to be the beginning and end of the inquiry.28 7
If the Court had intended for there to be a second step to the
analysis, it would have said so. To create a second step in the
analysis of the exclusion is an impermissible supplementation
of the Supreme Court's ruling, as it changes the focus of the
analysis.
The "return to capital" theory used by many courts to jus-
tify including punitive damages in gross income is not really de-
terminative.m Courts that use this theory hold that only
compensatory damages serve to make a person whole.2 9 They
283. Compare Wesson, 48 F.3d at 894, Hawkins, 30 F.3d at 1077 and Reese, 24
F.3d at 228.
284. Burke, 504 U.S. at 237.
285. See, e.g., Hawkins, 30 F.3d 1077 (stating that the analysis also requires
the court to determine whether the damages were received on account of personal
injury).
286. Burke, 504 U.S. at 237. See supra note 148.
287. Burke, 929 F.2d at 1123. The Supreme Court agreed with this portion of
the Sixth Circuit's opinion. Burke, 504 U.S. at 237. See supra text accompanying
notes 147-48.
288. See Wesson, 48 F.3d at 894; Hawkins, 30 F.3d at 1077; Reese, 24 F.3d at
228; Miller, 914 F.2d at 586.
289. Hawkins, 30 F.3d at 1083-84; Reese, 24 F.3d at 231-32; Miller, 914 F.2d
at 589.
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reason that punitive damages are over and above the amount
needed to compensate the plaintiff and are therefore a clear ac-
cession to wealth.290 However, compensatory damages, like pu-
nitive damages, can also represent a windfall to the plaintiff
and, in essence, make him more than "whole." Often, an in-
jured plaintiff receives more than is required to compensate him
for his injury.2 1 This is because it can be difficult to put a dollar
value on an injury.292
Furthermore, it is hard to determine what a person's ba-
sis293 is in his own body. It is, therefore, difficult to ascertain
whether the taxpayer has realized a clear gain under the I.R.C.
For that reason, compensatory damages often provide the plain-
tiff with a clear accession to wealth that, nevertheless, is not
taxable under § 104(a)(2).
Furthermore, the "return to capital" theory does not ex-
plain why punitive damages are excludable from gross income
in physical injury cases after the 1989 amendment. 294 It follows
290. Hawkins, 30 F.3d at 1080, 1083-84; Reese, 24 F.3d at 231-32; Miller, 914
F.2d at 589-90.
291. Hawkins, 30 F.3d at 1087 (Trott, J., dissenting).
292. Horton, 33 F.3d at 632.
293. "Basis" is the term used in I.R.C. § 1011 (1994). It is defined as the "total
amount of capital expenditures with respect to an asset (in most cases the cost of
purchase plus the cost of 'improvements' on the asset) .... " DODGE, supra note 3,
at 3.
Basis is used to calculate taxable gain or deductible loss to the taxpayer.
I.R.C. § 1001 (1994). This is done by subtracting the taxpayer's basis from the
amount realized in a transaction. Id. Amount realized is "the sum of any money
received plus the fair market value of the property (other than money) received."
I.R.C. § 1001(b).
In the scenario of a damage recovery, compensatory damages are meant to
make the taxpayer whole so that he realizes no gain or loss on the transaction.
This requires that the amount realized equal the taxpayer's basis. Amount real-
ized is easily determined as the amount of the damage award received by the tax-
payer in a suit or by settlement. However, a taxpayer's basis cannot be
determined when a damage recovery is meant to compensate for physical injuries
since it is impossible to put a precise dollar value on a person's health and body
parts.
The court's inability to determine basis in this situation renders the calcula-
tion of gain or loss a virtual impossibility. Thus, there is great risk that the tax-
payer will be either overcompensated or undercompensated for his injury. Where
overcompensation occurs, the amount over and above the basis should be taxable
gain but will not be recognized as such. Likewise, where undercompensation oc-
curs, the difference between the taxpayer's basis and the actual amount received
should be a deduction from gross income but will fail to be recognized as such.
294. See supra part V.
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logically that if punitive damages are a windfall to the plaintiff
in all situations, they should not be excludable where there is
physical injury. The "return to capital" theory does not provide
an explanation for this apparent contradiction. The only con-
clusion is that the "return to capital" theory is not the true basis
on which to determine the excludability of damages received for
personal injury or sickness.
Even if the circuit courts of appeals were not presently split
on this issue, it appears that the Tax Court would continue to
follow its reasoning in cases such as Miller295 and Horton296 and
find that punitive damages are excludable where the underly-
ing claim is tort-like. Thus far, the Tax Court has refused to
follow the Fourth and the District of Columbia Circuits.297 In-
stead, it has consistently held that punitive damages are ex-
cludable from gross income due to the plain language of the
statute.298 It is unlikely that the Tax Court will change its
stance on the issue since the entire panel of the Tax Court re-
viewed Miller and found punitive damages excludable.299
Unfortunately, it is unlikely that Congress will provide fur-
ther guidance in this area, since these cases will not be appear-
ing for much longer. As noted earlier, the pre-amended version
of the statute only applies to award amounts received before
July 10, 1989.300 As time passes, fewer cases will fall under the
pre-amended statute, despite the present backlog in the court
system. Congress will therefore have little incentive to take a
definite stance on this highly controversial matter.
B. Probable Effects of the 1989 Amendment
While the 1989 Amendment to § 104(a)(2)301 provides some
clarification on the excludability of punitive damage recoveries,
it still leaves much of the controversy intact. The amendment
also creates several new issues for the courts to decide.
295. Miller, 93 T.C. at 330. See supra text accompanying notes 112-14.
296. Horton, 100 T.C. at 93. See supra text accompanying notes 163-72.
297. The Tax Court has not followed Miller, 914 F.2d at 586, or Reese, 24 F.3d
at 228.
298. See, e.g., Horton, 100 T.C. at 93; Miller, 93 T.C. at 330.
299. Miller, 93 T.C. at 341-42.
300. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239,
§ 7641(b), 103 Stat. 2106, 2379 (1989).
301. Id. § 7641(a). See discussion supra part V.
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First, it is not clear whether punitive damages are excluda-
ble where the case does involve physical injury or sickness.30 2
If, by negative implication, the amendment excludes punitive
damages in physical injury cases, several of the courts that
have found punitive damages to always be includable in gross
income303 will have to adjust their analysis. These courts have
found under the pre-amended statute that punitive damage re-
coveries are always taxable because they represent accessions
to wealth that do not serve to make the plaintiff whole.304
If the pre-amended section did not exclude punitive dam-
ages, the amendment actually serves to broaden the § 104(a)(2)
exclusion by allowing punitive damages to be excluded from
gross income where there is physical injury or sickness. Such a
broadening of the scope of § 104(a)(2) is clearly inconsistent
with the Congressional intent behind the amendment. 305 Con-
gress only intended to clarify the exclusion and eliminate the
situation where courts were allowing damages to be excluded in
cases that did not involve physical injury.30 6 Thus, Congress
was actually limiting the scope of the exclusion. Any interpre-
tation that the amendment served to broaden the exclusion
clearly contradicts Congress' actual intent, and is therefore
invalid.
Additionally, if courts continue to follow the rationale that
all punitive damages are includable in gross income regardless
of whether physical injury is involved, they essentially render
the amendment meaningless. Those courts which have held
that punitive damages should be included in income because
they are not "on account of" personal injury or sickness,30 7 have
utilized a rationale that clearly contradicts the plain language
of the amendment. The amendment obviously must allow for
302. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
303. See Hawkins, 30 F.3d at 1077; Reese, 24 F.3d at 228; Kemp v. Commis-
sioner, 771 F. Supp. 357 (N.D. Ga. 1991).
304. See Wesson, 48 F.3d at 898; Hawkins, 30 F.3d at 1083-84; Miller, 914
F.2d at 590.
305. See supra text accompanying notes 270-73.
306. H.R. REP. No. 247, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 1354-55 (1989), reprinted in
1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1906, 2825; see also supra text accompanying notes 270-71.
307. See Wesson, 48 F.3d at 894; Hawkins, 30 F.3d at 1077; Reese, 24 F.3d at
228; Miller, 914 F.2d at 586.
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the exclusion of punitive damages in at least some cases involv-
ing physical injury or sickness.
The 1989 amendment states that § 104(a)(2) does not apply
to punitive damages received in connection with a case not in-
volving physical injury or physical sickness.308 Congress must
have intended for punitive damages to either always be exclud-
able where they are received in a case involving physical injury
or sickness, or, at least be excludable in some cases involving
physical injury or sickness. If Congress wanted punitive dam-
ages never to be excluded from gross income, it could have ex-
plicitly expressed that intent in the statute. Furthermore, the
legislative history indicates that Congress was only concerned
with the situation where punitive damages were excluded when
there was no physical injury.30 9 There is no indication that Con-
gress wanted to tax punitive damages in all cases.
If courts continue to rule that all punitive damages are ex-
cludable from income, they will be rendering the amendment
meaningless. Although the amendment does not explicitly state
that punitive damages in physical injury cases should always be
excluded from gross income, it is apparent they must be exclud-
able in at least some, if not all, situations. Otherwise, Congress
would have affirmatively made punitive damages includable in
gross income in all cases. The courts will therefore have to de-
velop a new analysis for deciding whether or not to exclude pu-
nitive damages in physical injury cases. Certainly, their
present blanket rule that never allows for exclusion will not
suffice.
Furthermore, courts that do not allow the exclusion of puni-
tive damages will also have difficulty explaining why punitive
damages may be excluded in physical injury cases after the
amendment and not in nonphysical injury cases. In either case,
those courts would presumably deem punitive damages to be a
windfall to the plaintiff, serving no compensatory purpose, and
therefore includable in gross income. This blanket analysis is
not consistent with the present amended statute. Those courts
might argue that the amendment's double-negative nature al-
lows them to render all punitive damages includable in income.
308. I.R.C. § 104(a) (1994).
309. See supra part V.
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However, that statutory analysis would also render the amend-
ment ineffective.
Although the amendment does not serve to overrule any of
the recent court decisions to include punitive damages in gross
income (since they did not involve physical injury), it may im-
pact the Internal Revenue Service's approach to this issue. At
least in part, the amendment may overrule Internal Revenue
Service ruling 84-108.310
The Revenue Ruling stated that punitive damages are not
excludable in the settlement of a wrongful death claim.3 11
Clearly, if the amendment is taken to exclude punitive damages
where there is physical injury or sickness, punitive damages
would be excludable in the settlement of a wrongful death ac-
tion. This directly contradicts the Internal Revenue Service's
ruling in 84-108. Even if the amendment only excludes some
punitive damages in physical injury cases, the Service will have
to revise its analysis in the future since it cannot render all pu-
nitive damages includable in gross income without rendering
the amendment meaningless.
Both the courts and the Internal Revenue Service will
therefore have to adopt a new analysis in dealing with this is-
sue. The most obvious answer is for them to apply the Supreme
Court's analysis in United States v. Burke.31 2 Once it is deter-
mined that the underlying claim is for physical injury, obviously
a tort-like cause of action, all punitive damages resulting there-
from should be excluded from gross income under § 104(a)(2).
Such an approach is consistent with the Court's ruling and the
amendment. This way only punitive damages awarded in con-
nection with a physical injury case can be excluded. All other
punitive damages, not passing this test, would therefore be in-
cluded in gross income.
Second, the amendment is unclear as to whether punitive
damages should be excluded from gross income where the claim
itself is not one for physical injury or sickness, but where the
tortfeasor's conduct has resulted in physical injury sickness.
Such a situation can arise where a plaintiff in a nonphysical
310. Rev. Rul. 84-108, 1984-2 C.B. 32. See supra text accompanying notes 60-
70.
311. Rev. Rul. 84-108, 1984-2 C.B. 32.
312. 504 U.S. 229 (1992). See supra part N.A.
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injury suit seeks to recover for emotional distress or pain and
suffering. The most logical approach to this issue would be for
punitive damages to be excluded whenever physical injury or
sickness manifests itself in the suit, regardless of the nature of
the claim.
To draw a distinction between the two situations would cre-
ate an absolute contradiction. Obviously, in both situations, the
tort-like claim involves physical injury. The only difference is
that, in one, the claim itself is for physical injury, while, in the
other, it is not. This approach will eliminate the inquiry into
what is meant by "involves," and therefore curb future contro-
versy over this issue.
Also, the plain meaning of the amendment suggests that all
punitive damages are to be excluded if any part of the underly-
ing claim relates to physical injuries. The most logical interpre-
tation of "involving physical injury or sickness" is that the cases
must include some manifestation of physical injury. It would be
illogical to conclude that a defamation suit does not involve
physical injury or sickness where the plaintiff has suffered emo-
tional distress or pain and suffering.
Furthermore, the legislative history of the statute indicates
that the "involving" language of the amendment is meant as
"originating with."3 13 Therefore, whenever the case "originates
with" physical injury or sickness, despite whether the claim it-
self is for such physical injury, the punitive damages awarded
should be excluded from gross income under § 104(a)(2).
Finally, it is unclear how broadly courts should define what
constitutes physical injury or physical sickness under the
amended section § 104(a)(2). It is apparent that defamation
and employment discrimination are not physical injuries. How-
ever, what other causes of action are non-physical injury claims
under the amendment? 14 Since Congress has not yet provided
313. See H.R. REP. No. 247, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 1354-55 (1989), reprinted in
1989 U.S.C.CA.N. 1906, 2825. The House Report stated that "if an action has its
origin in a physical injury or physical sickness, then all damages that flow there-
from are treated as payments involving physical injury or physical sickness." Id.
314. Other possible examples of non-physical injury claims are: claims for
economic loss due to property damage; claims under the antitrust laws; and claims
for breach of contract.
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a workable definition for the terms, the interpretation will be
left for the courts to determine.
Until these complex issues are resolved by Congress or un-
til courts reach a consensus, the controversy surrounding the
§ 104(a)(2) exclusion will persist. However, it is possible to for-
mulate some conclusions as to the effect the amendment will
have on future cases that will soon face the courts.
In states where punitive damages are deemed to have some
compensatory purpose, 15 the punitive damage awards will
probably still be excluded in cases that do not involve physical
injury or sickness. In some states, the law provides that puni-
tive damages serve to compensate the plaintiff for injuries that
cannot be specifically ascertained. 16 Because, in these circum-
stances, a punitive damage award is not purely punitive, the
rationale for including them in gross income does not apply.
However, the individual states must decide how their punitive
damage awards should be defined in order for the courts to de-
termine whether they should be excluded from gross income.3 17
The amendment may also create new problems with the al-
location of damage awards. In the case of settlement, it may be
difficult for the court to determine which portion of the settle-
ment is attributable to punitive damages and should therefore
be includable. 318 In the past, courts have looked to the amount
of punitive damages requested in the complaint to determine
what portion of the settlement proceeds should be allocated to
punitive damages. 31 9 However, in the future, attorneys will rec-
315. See, e.g., Horton, 100 T.C. at 100 ('[1n Kentucky, punitive damages serve
both to compensate the injured party and punish the wrongdoer.").
316. See Horton, 100 T.C. at 93. The Tax Court noted in Horton that the Ken-
tucky Supreme Court explicitly found that the punitive damages were awarded
since injury had been increased by the manner in which it was inflicted. Id. at 100
(citing Chiles v. Drake, 59 Ky. (2 Met.) 146, 74 (1859)). The damages were "al-
lowed by way of remuneration for the aggravated wrong done." Id. (quoting Louis-
ville & N.R. Co. v. Roth, 114 S.W. 264, 266 (Ky. 1908)).
317. This approach was adopted by the Fourth Circuit in Miller, 914 F.2d 586.
The court found that "under Maryland law, 'punitive damages are inherently dif-
ferent from compensatory damages and the reasons for the award of each differ
sharply.'" Id. at 589 (citing Exxon Corp. v. Yarema, 516 A.2d 990, 997 (Md. App.
1986), cert. denied, 522 A.2d 392 (Md. 1987)).
318. Jaeger, supra note 29, at 114.
319. See Robinson v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 116 (1994). The court stated
that normally the allocation in a settlement agreement will be binding for tax pur-
poses. Id. at 127. However, if such allocation is clearly contrary to the amounts
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ognize the possible risks associated with settlement and will
therefore request more compensatory damages in the complaint
itself. This will have the effect of allowing the plaintiff to ex-
clude more than he would be able to otherwise, thereby counter-
acting the amendment. Courts will have to develop some
means by which to remedy this situation. This could be accom-
plished by thoroughly examining the facts of the case and deter-
mining exactly what amount is necessary to compensate the
plaintiff for harm suffered. However, this method would force
courts to make factual determinations that were never made at
trial due to settlement. Furthermore, it is often difficult to as-
certain the exact amount necessary to compensate an injured
plaintiff, since many injuries are intangible.3 20 Ultimately,
courts will be confronted with more complex allocation issues
than they faced in the past.
The 1989 amendment may also create new problems in em-
ployment discrimination cases. For example, only liquidated
damages are recoverable under the Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act.321 Recent cases have shown that the courts may
be willing to classify liquidated damages as compensatory and
therefore excludable from gross income under § 104(a)(2).3 22
However, the circuits are presently split on this issue.323
Under the amendment, the determination of whether liqui-
dated damages are compensatory or punitive in nature becomes
more significant. If they are punitive, they cannot be excluded
sought in the complaint, then the court will determine the payor's intent from all
facts and circumstances of the case at issue. Id.
320. Horton, 33 F.3d at 632.
321. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1988). Liquidated damages as referred to in the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act "is the sum which a party to a contract agrees
to pay if he breaks some promise and, which having been arrived at by good faith
effort to estimate actual damage that will probably ensue from breach, is recover-
able as agreed damages if breach occurs." BLAcies LAw DicTioNARY 391 (6th ed.
1990). Under the Act, liquidated damages can be recovered when the employer
has willfully violated the statute. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1988).
322. See, e.g., Schmitz v. Commissioner, 34 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1994); Downey
v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 634 (1993), rev'd, 33 F.3d 836 (7th Cir. 1994). It is well
beyond the scope of this article to explore this issue. For further discussion, see
Carolyn F. Kolks, United States v. Burke - Does it Definitively Resolve the Analyti-
cal Confusion Created by the Section 104(a)(2) Personal Injury Exclusion? 45 ARK.
L. REv. 657 (1993).
323. See Schmitz v. Commissioner, 34 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1994); Downey v.
Commissioner, 33 F.3d 836 (7th Cir. 1994).
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under § 104(a)(2) because discrimination does not involve phys-
ical injury or sickness. If they are compensatory, they are ex-
cludable under the statute. Therefore plaintiffs must argue
that liquidated damages are more compensatory than punitive
in nature.
VII. Conclusion
The controversy surrounding the exclusion of punitive dam-
ages from gross income has survived despite legislative and ju-
dicial attempts to provide a rational interpretation of
§ 104(a)(2). Courts will continue to be faced with issues sur-
rounding the exclusion. Unfortunately, they lack the explicit
guidance that is needed in this highly controversial area of tax
law. Until Congress takes further action, courts will have to
develop an appropriate method with which to deal with these
issues.
Although cases will continue to confront the courts under
the pre-amended statute, there is little chance that Congress
will speak on the issue. However, there is still adequate oppor-
tunity for the Legislature to clarify the present statute. It ap-
pears logical that punitive damages are excluded from gross
income where there is some manifestation of personal injury in
the case, but many courts will inevitably disagree with this ra-
tionale. For this reason, the legislature should define its stance
and amend the statute.
The present "double-negative" nature of the amendment
perpetuates the confusion. Congress would be prudent to
amend the statute to affirmatively state that punitive damages
are excludable from gross income where the case involves physi-
cal injury or sickness. Furthermore, it should provide explicit
definitions of "involving" and "physical injury or physical sick-
ness." Only by amending the statute will Congress finally end
the controversy surrounding the § 104(a)(2) exclusion.
Wendy S. Kennedy*
* This comment is dedicated to my parents. Without the loving support of my
family and Michael Venoit, this comment could not have been written.
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